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JURISDICTION
No. 89-0497: The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of defendants and appellees Frederick G.
Becker II, Margaret M. Becker (the "Beckers"), J. Lynn Dougan
and Diana Lady Dougan (the "Dougans") on May 5, 1989. R.
1414-1416.

The judgment was certified as final pursuant to

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff and

appellant First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First
Interstate") filed a notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court on May 16, 1989. R. 1426-1428. Jurisdiction was
invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).

The Utah

Supreme Court assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
No. 89-0607: The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of defendant and appellee Park Meadows
Investment Co. ("Park Meadows") on July 6, 1989. R.
1537-1538.

A timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme

Court was filed on Monday, August 7, 1989. R. 1539-1543.
Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(i).

The Utah Supreme Court assigned the appeal to

the Utah Court of Appeals.
No. 98-0597: The district court awarded the Beckers
and Dougans their claimed costs on July 6, 1989. R.

1

"R." refers to the record on appeal prepared in accordance with Rule
11(d)(2)(B), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
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1517-1519.

Following a timely appeal to the Utah Supreme

Court, the appeal was remanded to this Court,

This Court

subsequently consolidated all appeals in this matter.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Whether First Interstate properly accelerated
payment of a note executed by Park Meadows' predecessor in
interest and guaranteed by the Beckers and Dougans?
2.
Whether the Beckers and Dougans, as guarantors
of the note, were entitled to notice of the principal
obligor's default?
3.
Whether, even assuming some default in First
Interstate's notice obligations, the Beckers and Dougans are
properly entitled to an absolute discharge without a showing
of prejudice?
4.
Whether First Interstate is entitled to partial
summary judgment establishing the Beckers' and Dougans'
liability under the note?
5.
Whether Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, permits the recovery of deposition costs unrelated
to the merits of a motion for summary judgment?
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (1986) and Rule 54(d)(2),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are reproduced as Addendum A to
this brief.

Rule 24(f), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the case and proceedings below

First Interstate commenced this action in December
1986 by filing a complaint in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, Summit County, against Park Meadows, the
Beckers, the Dougans, Victor R. Ayers and Marion P. Ayers (the

"Ayers").

The complaint, filed by leave of the bankruptcy

court in the midst of a protracted Chapter 11 proceeding

3
i n v o l v i n g Park Meadows,

sought j u d i c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e of a deed

of t r u s t executed by Park Meadow's predecessor in i n t e r e s t ,
w e l l as c o l l e c t i o n of the underlying n o t e .

as

That note had been

guaranteed by the Beckers, the Dougans and the Ayers.

R.

1-28.
On September 26, 1988, F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e f i l e d a
motion for p a r t i a l summary judgment seeking t o e s t a b l i s h the
l i a b i l i t y of the Beckers, Dougans and Ayers as guarantors of
the n o t e .

R. 723-798.

That motion was denied by the d i s t r i c t

court on December 8, 1988.

R. 1098-1100.

On February 3,

1989, the Beckers and Dougans f i l e d a motion for summary
judgment seeking discharge of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s as guarantors
on the ground t h a t F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e had improperly a c c e l e r a t e d
the n o t e .

R. 1121-1202.

That motion, which was granted,

provides the b a s i s for t h i s appeal.
B.

Factual background

In December 1978, Park City Racquet Club, Inc.
("PCRC") obtained an $800,000 loan from Walker Bank, a

2

The complaint a l s o named F i r s t Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as a
defendant. F i r s t Security was j o i n e d in the s u i t because i t held a
junior secured i n t e r e s t in the racquet club property. No claim,
however, was a s s e r t e d against F i r s t Security.

3

F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e was granted r e l i e f from the automatic stay on November
15, 1986. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

-

3 -

predecessor of First Interstate.

The loan was evidenced by a

note executed by Frederick G. Becker, II, president of PCRC,
and Victor R. Ayers, secretary of the corporation.

R.

1261-1264 (a copy of the note is attached as Addendum B to
this brief).

The note was secured by a deed of trust covering

PCRC's principal asset, a racquet club located in Park City,
Utah.

In addition, the note was personally guaranteed by

Becker and his wife, Ayers and his wife, and the Dougans (the
"guarantors").

The guaranty, appended to the end of the note,

provides in its entirety (R. 1263; Addendum B):
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt
and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged,
the undersigned jointly and severally guarantee
payment of this Promissory Note (Secured by Deed
of Trust) and further guarantee payment of the
entire indebtedness evidenced thereby and the
Deed of Trust securing the same.
On May 19, 1982, PCRC transferred undivided one-third
interests in the racquet club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers.
This transfer was explicitly made "[sjubject to a loan in
favor of Walker Bank & Trust Company . . . the unpaid balance
of which the Grantee [i.e.. Becker, Dougan and Ayers] hereby
agrees to assume and pay."

R. 1266-1267.

In August 1982,

Becker and Dougan exchanged their interests in the racquet
club for certain lots in a Park City development owned by Park
Meadows, a partnership consisting of Enoch Smith, Enoch
Richard Smith and Ayers.

R. 1269, 1271. As part of this

exchange, Park Meadows and its partners agreed to fully

indemnify Becker and Dougan from any liability (including
attorneys' fees) arising from their guaranty of the note.

R.

1182.
The Beckers and Dougans asserted that, at the time of
the exchange, Park Meadows assumed the payment obligations
evidenced by the note.

E.g., R. 1319.

Indeed, by letter

dated September 2, 1982, to First Interstate, Dougan told
First Interstate that Park Meadows had assumed full
responsibility for the loan.

R. 1271.

Dougan also testified

that he instructed First Interstate to send all further
notices to Park Meadows (R. 1274):
Q.

After the exchange, did you continue to
receive payment notices on the racquet club
for a period of time?

A.

No, not to my recollection. I think - - We
very clearly noticed the bank not only were
we exchanging our interests but that the
Smiths and Park Meadows — Smiths and Ayers
and Park Meadows Development were assuming
and paying the loan and they would do so
after a date certain. And my recollection
is that we didn't receive any further
notices.

Q,

You directed the bank to sent the notices
someplace else?

A.

I would - - yes.

Q.

That was a "yes"?

A.

Yes. That was a "yes".

- 5 -

The Beckers and Dougans, however, have never produced, nor has
First Interstate received, a copy of an assumption agreement
executed by Park Meadows.
Following its acquisition of the racquet club, Park
Meadows encountered substantial difficulties meeting its
obligations under the note.

Pursuant to Mr. Dougan's

directions (R. 1271, 1274), First Interstate sent notices of
nonpayment to Park Meadows.

In addition, in June 198 5, First

Interstate and Park Meadows entered into a work-out agreement
to restructure other outstanding loans made to Park Meadows by
First interstate and First Security.

R. 1057-1059

A copy of

the work-out agreement is attached as Addendum C to this
brief.

Park Meadows, however, failed to comply with the terms

of the work-out agreement.

First Interstate also did not

receive any payments due under the note after November 1,
1985.

R. 756.
On January 24, 1986, First Interstate notified Enoch

Richard Smith, a partner of Park Meadows, that the note was in
default and that, unless all past due amounts under the note
were paid by February 7, 1986, First Interstate would "take
the legal actions available to them under the terms of the
loan documents."

R. 1193. Among the actions available to

First Interstate was the right, "without notice or demand," to
declare "the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal
and interest . . . immediately due and payable" if Park

- 6 -

Meadow's default was not cured "within fifteen (15) days
following . . . written notice" of default.

Addendum B. The

note expressly provided that "written notice shall be
effective as of the time the same is deposited in the United
Sataes [sic] Mails addressed to the last known address of the
undersigned or the time of the actual receipt thereof, if
earlier."

Id.

The note further provided that (id.):

The makers, . . . guarantors, and endorsers
hereof severally waive . . . notice of
nonpayment, and expressly agree that this Note,
or any payment hereunder, may be extended from
time to time by the holder hereof without in any
way affecting the liability of such parties.
On February 10, 1986 —

seventeen days after

notifying Park Meadows of its default —

First Interstate

executed a statutory notice of default accelerating the sums
payable under the note.
February 14, 1986.

The notice of default was recorded on

R. 1195. On February 21, 1986, copies of

the notice of default were sent by certified mail to, among
others, PCRC, Frederick G. Becker, II, Margaret M. Becker, J.
Lynn Dougan, and Diana Lady Dougan.

R. 1277-1283. J. Lynn

Dougan later acknowledged that PCRC received a copy of the
notice of default at its corporate address shortly after
February 21, 1986. R. 1198.

Following receipt of the notice

of default, the Beckers and Dougans had a statutory threemonth period in which they could cure the default in the note

- 7

by paying all then past-due sums.
§ 57-1-31(1).

Utah Code Ann,

That right to cure was not exercised.

The property was not sold pursuant to the statutory
notice of default.

On March 24, 1986, an involuntary

bankruptcy proceeding was initiated against Park Meadows. The
filing of that action automatically stayed the pending sale of
the property under the deed of trust.

11 U.S.C § 3 62.

This

action, seeking judicial foreclosure, was instituted in
December 1986 after First Interstate obtained relief from that
automatic stay.
On January 26, 1987, the district court appointed a
receiver to manage the racquet club.

R. 47-49.

Then, on

October 16, 1987, and pursuant to stipulation of the parties,
the district court entered an order permitting the sale of the
racquet club.
757.

The sales price of the club was $425,000.

R.

All proceeds from the sale of the club were applied to

the note.

Id.

As of September 26, 1988, there remained due

and owing under the terms of the note the principal sum of
$719,517.54, together with approximately $100,000 in accrued
interest*

Id«

As a result, the liability of the Beckers,

Dougans and Ayers as guarantors of the note became the focus
of this litigation.
C.

Arguments and decision below

On September 26, 1988, First Interstate moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the liability of the Beckers
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and Dougans under the note.

R. 730-798.

In their answer to

the complaint, the Beckers and Dougans asserted that First
Interstate had released one of the partners of Park Meadows
and had otherwise impaired the collateral securing the note.
R. 114. These actions, they contended, resulted in the
discharge of their guaranty obligations.

Id.

First

Interstate submitted that these defenses were factually
unsupported because undisputed record evidence demonstrated
that the bank had not released any of the principals of Park
Meadows and had applied the entire proceeds of the sale of the
racquet club to the note.

R. 740-746, 749-750.

In addition,

First Interstate argued that the defenses were legally
inadequate because the Beckers and Dougans were fully
indemnified sureties.
May 5, 1989.

R. 746-749.

This motion was denied on

R. 1414-1416.

The Beckers and Dougans thereafter filed their own
motion for summary judgment.

The motion was founded upon an

exceedingly narrow ground: that First Interstate had not
properly accelerated the debt evidenced by the note.
1124-1173.

The acceleration was defective, the Beckers and

Dougans asserted, because First Interstate had not given 15
days written notice of its intent to accelerate (R.
1149-1153), and had failed to give written notice to PCRC —
the original maker of the note.

R. 1135-1149.

In addition,

the Beckers and Dougans contended that, even though the
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language of their guaranty contains no express notice
requirement, they were entitled to notice because the note and
the guaranty should be "read together."

R. 1153-1171.

In response, First Interstate argued that its January
24, 1986 letter to Park Meadows strictly complied with the
15-day notice provisions contained in the note.

R. 1242-1245.

Moreover, notification of Park Meadows rather than PCRC was
appropriate for several reasons: first, the bank had been
directed to send all further notices to Park Meadows (R.
1271-1274); second, notification of PCRC was impossible
because the corporation had been dissolved on December 21,
1982 (R. 1392-1407); and third, by virtue of the assumption of
the note, Park Meadows as assignee was entitled to first
receive the notice of default.

The Beckers and Dougans,

furthermore, were not entitled to notice as guarantors because
their guaranty did not contain an express notice provision.
R. 1245-1255.

Finally, even if the Beckers and Dougans were

entitled to notice, defective notice did not properly result
in their absolute discharge but rather released them only to
the extent they established prejudice —

which they could not

because of their failure to cure Park Meadows' default during
the three-month statutory cure period.

R. 123 5, 1241; Utah

Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1).
The district court granted the Beckers' and Dougans'
motion for summary judgment by order entered May 5, 1989.

- 10 -

That order found that "[t]he giving of a proper 15 day notice
was a condition precedent to the right of plaintiff to
exercise its option to accelerate" the note.

R. 1415. The

court then found, without specifying a precise shortcoming,
that "[t]he notice required to be given by plaintiff to
defendant Park Meadows Development prior to plaintiff
exercising its option to accelerate was defective."

Id.

Finally, the court found that "[t]he 15 day notice required by
the loan documents to be given prior to accelerating the
Racquet Club note was not given by plaintiff to the original
maker, Park City Racquet Club, to defendants Dougans, Beckers
and Ayers, who assumed the Racquet Club note and thereby
became makers, nor to defendants Dougans, Beckers and Ayers in
their capacity as guarantors."

Id.

Without further

discussion, the court entered a judgment of "no cause of
action" in favor of the Beckers and the Dougans.

R. 1416.

On May 19, 1989, Park Meadows filed a motion for
summary judgment based on the district court's finding that
First Interstate's notice to Park Meadows "was defective."
1451.

R.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment on

July 6, 1989.

R. 1537-1538.

While Park Meadows' motion for summary judgment was
pending, the Beckers and Dougans filed a Memorandum of Costs
and Disbursements, seeking to recover nearly $2,800 in
deposition costs.

R. 1421-1423.

- 11 -

First Interstate objected to

the recovery of those costs because the depositions were not
necessary to the prosecution of the summary judgment motion.
R. 1453-1460.

The district court rejected First Interstate's

submission, and permitted recovery of all claimed deposition
costs.
Unlike the Beckers, Dougans and Park Meadows, the
Ayers have not moved for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the

claims against the Ayers are still pending before the district
court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's judgment rests upon a series of
interlocking —

but fundamentally flawed —

propounded by the Beckers and Dougans.

propositions

First, they argued

that First Interstate erroneously gave 14 —

rather than 15 —

days notice of its intent to accelerate the note.

Next, they

asserted that the notice was insufficient because it was given
to the primary obligor under the note —
rather than the original maker, PCRC.

Park Meadows —

Finally, they submitted

that their guaranty obligations have been discharged because
they did not receive 15 days notice of First Interstate's
intent to accelerate.

These arguments are unavailing.

First Interstate#s written notice of its intent to
accelerate strictly complied with the notice provisions of the
note.

Pursuant to well-established law, that notice was

properly given to the primary obligor under the note.
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And,

because the Beckers' and Dougans' guaranty did not contain an
express notice provision, they were not entitled to notice
prior to acceleration.

Moreover, even if the Beckers and

Dougans could establish a right to notice as guarantors, any
failure to receive notice does not result in their absolute
discharge, but rather releases them only to the extent they
demonstrate prejudice —
this record.

a showing conclusively precluded by

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1).

Indeed, far from

excusing their voluntarily incurred contractual obligations,
the record below unequivocally establishes the Beckers' and
Dougans' liability under the note.

The district court,

therefore, should be reversed and this case remanded with
directions to enter partial summary judgment in favor of First
Interstate.
In addition to the foregoing, the district court
improperly permitted the Beckers and Dougans to recover costs
incurred in taking depositions completely unrelated to the
merits of their motion for summary judgment.

Rule 54(d)(2),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, precludes this result.
ARGUMENT
I.

FIRST INTERSTATE'S WRITTEN NOTICE OF INTENT TO
ACCELERATE WAS NOT DEFECTIVE
The Beckers and Dougans argued, and the district

court found, that "[t]he notice required to be given by
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plaintiff to defendant Park Meadows Development prior to
plaintiff exercising its option to accelerate was defective."
R. 1415.

The sole defect isolated by the Beckers and Dougans

was that the January 24, 1986 letter to Park Meadows gave "14
days written notice" while First Interstate "had to give 15
days notice before exercising its option to accelerate."
1149.

R.

This assertion, however, is both hypertechnical and

controverted by the express terms of the note.
To begin with, the note does not require —
Beckers and Dougans asserted below (R. 1149) —

as the

that First

Interstate explicitly warn a defaulting party when the 15-day
cure period will expire.

Rather, the note provides that

notice of default must be given,

Then, following such notice,

First Interstate has the option to declare "the entire
remaining unpaid balances of both principal and interest . . .
immediately due and payable" if the default is not cured
"within fifteen (15) days following such written notice."
Addendum B.

The actual acceleration, moreover, may occur

"without notice or demand."

Id.

Thus, all that the plain

terms of the note require is notice followed by a 15-day cure
period.

The undisputed facts here establish that First

Interstate accelerated the note 17 days after giving notice to
Park Meadows.

Because the law requires no more than

"substantial compliance with [a] notice requirement" (Local
No. 1179 v. Merchants Mutual Bonding Co.. 613 P.2d 944, 947
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(Kan. 1 9 8 0 ) ) , the complaint that the bank f a i l e d t o provide 15
day's n o t i c e i s "too meticulous and f r i v o l o u s t o warrant
serious consideration."

McKeanev v. I l l i n o i s Surety Co.. 155

N.Y.S. 1041, 1043 (N.Y.S.Ct.

1915).4

In any event, F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e complied with the
s t r i c t e s t p o s s i b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the a p p l i c a b l e n o t i c e
provisions.

Even assuming — as the Beckers and Dougans claim

— t h a t the n o t i c e must s p e c i f y when the 15-day cure period
w i l l e x p i r e , the January 24, 1986 l e t t e r t o Park Meadows
properly computed t h a t period.

Pursuant t o the note,

"written

n o t i c e s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e as of the time the same i s deposited
in the United Sataes [ s i c ] Mails addressed t o the l a s t known
address of the undersigned or the time of the actual r e c e i p t
thereof,

if earlier."

Addendum B (emphasis added).

It

is

undisputed t h a t , on January 24, 1986, Park Meadows received
formal n o t i c e from F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e that the note was in
d e f a u l t and t h a t , u n l e s s the d e f a u l t were cured by February 7,

4

Accord. Broward County Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Fund v, Sevgo
Construction Co.. 570 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ( r e j e c t i n g the
a s s e r t i o n that n o t i c e of nonpayment of c e r t a i n fringe b e n e f i t s must
"conform to the l e t t e r " of s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e requirements; notice need
only be "adequately given"); Svkes v. Sperov. 179 P. 488, 489 (Ore.
1919) ( r e j e c t i n g the argument that a surety was e n t i t l e d to discharge
because n o t i c e was sent to i t s Portland, Oregon, o f f i c e rather than i t s
New York City o f f i c e ; "any difference in the mere manner of transmitting
i t , from the method provided in the contract, . . . [ i s ] merely
t e c h n i c a l and t r i v i a l , and could have caused no injury or prejudice to
the defendant"); McKegnev v. I l l i n o i s Surety Co.. 155 N.Y.S. 1041, 1043
(N.Y.S.Ct. 1915) ( r e j e c t i n g argument that hand-delivered, rather than
mailed, n o t i c e was d e f e c t i v e ) .
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the bank would "take the legal actions available . . . under
the terms of the loan documents."

R. 1193.

It is similarly

undisputable that, if January 24 is counted as the first
effective day of notice —
terms of the note —

as it must be under the express

then February 7 is the fifteenth day.

The notice provided Park Meadows, therefore, was simply not
"defective."
The contrary assertion of the Beckers and Dougans is
based upon the submission that "in computing time for the
performance of a given act. . . , the courts have employed a
method of including either the first or last day and excluding
the other."

R. 1150, 1151-1153

This, of course, is a general

rule of construction that is reflected (among other places) in
, ,
5
the Rules of Civil Procedure.

General rules and canons of

construction, however, do not control when the parties to a
contract have specifically provided otherwise.

E.g.. Utah

Code Ann. § 70A-1-102(3)("The effect of provisions of this
[Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement").

Here,

the parties expressly provided that, while a 15-day cure
period was required prior to acceleration, notice of default
would be effective from either the time of mailing or receipt.
5

See, e.g.. Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("the day of the
act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins
to run shall not be included"). But see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26)
(1980)(notice required by the Uniform Commercial Code is effective when
it comes to a person's "attention" or is "duly delivered at the place of
business").
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First Interstate's notice to Park Meadows strictly complied
with these requirements.
Based on the foregoing, the summary judgment entered
in favor of Park Meadows must be reversed.

That motion was

founded solely upon the district court's patently erroneous
finding that First Interstate failed to give a proper, 15-day
notice to Park Meadows.

R. 1450-1452.

Because First

Interstate in fact complied with the notice requirements
embodied in the note, the summary judgment entered against
First Interstate in favor of Park Meadows must be set aside.
II.

THE PURPORTED NOTICE DEFECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE
BECKERS AND DOUGANS DO NOT ENTITLE THEM TO
DISCHARGE OF THEIR GUARANTY OBLIGATIONS
The bulk of Beckers' and Dougans' presentation below

was devoted to developing, in extenso (see R. 1133-1153, 11601172), two unremarkable (indeed, undisputed) principles of
law: (1) a creditor must give proper notice of its intent to
accelerate;

and (2) notice of the principal's default must be

given to guarantors if a guaranty contains an express notice
provision.

Unfortunately for the Beckers and Dougans,

however, these rules are not applicable here.

As shown above,

First Interstate gave proper notice of its intent to

6

E.g.. KIXX. Inc. v. Stallion Music Co.. 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980);
Williamson v. Wanlass. 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976).

7

E.g.. Waikiki Seaside Inc. v. Comito. 641 P.2d 1363 (Hawaii App. 1983);
Lee v. Vaughn. 534 S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1976).
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accelerate.

The guaranty executed by the Beckers and Dougans,

moreover, does not contain an express notice requirement and
they therefore were not entitled to notice of Park Meadow's
default.

Restatement of Security § 136 (1941).

Accord,

Corporation of the President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co., 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 1939); Western States Leasing Co.
v. Adturn, 500 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Colo. App. 1972).
Faced with these legal realities, the Beckers and
Dougans were forced to argue a series of untenable — and
unsupported —

propositions.

First, they claimed that the

note was improperly accelerated because the notice of default
was sent to Park Meadows rather than PCRC, the original maker
of the note.

R. 1135-1149.

Next, they asserted that an

"express" notice requirement could be "implied" into their
guaranty.

R. 1153-1160.

Finally, and underlying the two

preceding submissions, was the assumption that any defect in
notice —

however slight —

R. 1171-1172.

resulted in absolute discharge.

The district court, in granting summary

judgment, accepted this chain of reasoning.

R. 1415.

But,

while ingenious, this concatenation simply will not bear
weight.

Notice of First Interstate's intent to accelerate was

properly given to Park Meadows, the primary obligor under the
note.

Express notice provisions cannot be created by

implication.

And, equally important, even if the Beckers and

Dougans established a notice defect, that defect does not
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entitle them to absolute discharge.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 57-1-31(1).
A.

As The Primary Obligor Under The Note, Park
Meadows Was The Proper Entity To Receive
Any Notice Required By The Note

The Beckers and Dougans asserted that, because First
Interstate ''gave notice of intent to accelerate to [Park
Meadows], the holder of the note, but elected not to give such
notice to PCRC, the maker of the note," First Interstate
"effectively waived its right to accelerate the note as to the
maker PCRC and therefore has no claim against them as
guarantors.

R. 1149.

They also claimed that, because they

assumed PCRC's obligations under the note, they were entitled
to notice as "makers" of the note.

R. 1315-1320.

But, even

Q

beyond obvious t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t s ,

t h e s e arguments — which

were adopted by the d i s t r i c t court in granting summary
judgment (R. 1415) — lack merit for at l e a s t four reasons.
F i r s t , n o t i f i c a t i o n of PCRC was impossible: the corporation

Park Meadows, of course, was not "the holder of the note." R. 1149.
"Holder" i s a t e c h n i c a l term which refers to the person or e n t i t y
" e n t i t l e d to maintain an a c t i o n at law" on a note. 11 Am Jur 2d § 371
at 395. F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e , therefore, i s the "holder" of the note. At
the time i t received n o t i c e of d e f a u l t , Park Meadows had the l i a b i l i t y
of a "maker" because i t had assumed the loan. Mr. Becker and Mr.
Dougans moreover, simply cannot claim r i g h t s due a "maker" of the note.
While t h e i r assumption of the note gave them primary l i a b i l i t y under the
note, a f t e r the transfer of the note to Park Meadows t h e i r s t a t u s was
secondary -- they were s u r e t i e s no longer l i a b l e as p r i n c i p a l s on the
note. At the time of Park Meadow's d e f a u l t , therefore, Mr. Becker and
Mr. Dougans did not occupy the p o s i t i o n of a "maker."

-
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was dissolved.

Second, the Beckers and Dougans had themselves

directed First Interstate to deal with Park Meadows.

Third,

the posited notification requirement ignores commercial
reality.

Fourth, as the assignee and primary obligor under

the note, Park Meadows was the proper entity to receive notice
of default.
Just prior to argument of their summary judgment
motion, the Beckers and Dougans produced documents
demonstrating that PCRC was dissolved on December 21, 1982.
These documents, which included articles of dissolution and a
certificate from the Utah Department of Business Regulation
certifying the dissolution, were presented to the district
court.

R. 1392-1407.

Therefore, even if notice to the

original maker of a note were ordinarily a precondition to a
creditor's right of acceleration (which it is not), the
failure to notify PCRC here would have to be excused because
PCRC was no longer in existence.

"Under these circumstances,

the giving of notice . . . would have been an idle gesture —
a useless thing."

Sherman. Clay & Co. v. Turner, 2 P.2d 688,

691 (Wash. 1931).
The law does not, in any event, require notice to
PCRC or to the Beckers and Dougans as "makers" prior to
acceleration of the note.

First Interstate gave notice of

default to Park Meadows because it was instructed to do so by
Mr. Douaan.

Mr. Dougan informed First Interstate that Park
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Meadows had assumed the loan, and Dougan directed First
Interstate to send further notices regarding the loan to Park
Meadows.

R. 1271, 1274. Although the Beckers and Dougans

knew that the note provided for notice, they intentionally
directed First Interstate to deal with and send notices to
Park Meadows.

Therefore, if any of the parties have

"effectively waived [their] right[s]" in this case (R. 1149),
the Beckers and Dougans have waived any claimed right to
receive notice and they should be estopped from raising any
objection to the notice of default given by First Interstate.
See American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d
289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968)(waiver is an intentional relinquishment
of a known right).

The Beckers and Dougans certainly should

not be permitted to seize upon First Interstate's compliance
with their own directions to escape liability.
In addition to the above, the submission that the
original maker and all subsequent assignees of a note must be
notified prior to acceleration defies common sense and
commercial reality.

Commercial notes, such as the one

involved in this case, are frequently assigned by both the
holders and makers of the instruments.

To require the current

holder of a note, prior to enforcing its rights against the
current primary obligor, to notify the original maker as well
as all mesne assignees would impose an impractical — and
often futile —

obligation.

For one thing, the holder of a

- 21 -

note may not have accurate records —
obtaining accurate records —

nor any means of

of intermediate transfers.

In

this case, for example, although the Beckers and Dougans
assert that Park Meadows assumed the loan (R. 1180), First
Interstate has never received any documentation to support the
claimed assumption.

Moreover, providing notice to the

original maker and subsequent assignees will often be futile.
As in this case, the original maker (and subsequent assignees)
may no longer exist.

Therefore, the notice requirement

posited by the Beckers and Dougans, and adopted by the
district court, needlessly encumbers the utility of commercial
paper.
Finally, notification of the original maker and all
intermediate assignees is not required under well-established
principles of contract law.

The Beckers and Dougans assert

that they assumed the note from PCRC, and that Park Meadows
subsequently assumed the note from them.

Accordingly, First

Interstate was free to deal with Park Meadows as the primary
obligor under the note.

The Second Restatement of Contracts

§ 328 states the general principles of law governing the
assignment of contracts as follows:
(1) Unless the language or the circumstances
indicate the contrary, . . . an assignment of
"the contract" or of "all my rights under the
contract" or an assignment in similar general
terms is an assignment of the assignor's rights
and a delegation of his unperformed duties under
the contract.
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(2) Unless the language or the circumstances
indicate the contrary, the acceptance by an
assignee of such an assignment operates as a
promise to the assignor to perform the
assignor's unperformed duties, and the obligor
of the assigned rights is an intended
beneficiary of the promise.
Under the principles set forth in § 328 above, the
respective assumption agreements involving the note operated
as "an assignment of the assignors'] [e.g. , PCRC's, the
Beckers' and the Dougans'] rights and a delegation of [their]
unperformed duties under the contract."

To the extent that

PCRC and the Beckers and Dougans had a right to notice as
makers of the note, they assigned this right to Park Meadows
at the time Park Meadows assumed the note.

First Investment

Company v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980) ("Since the
notes were not negotiable, the transfer by the Nursery to
plaintiff must be deemed an assignment, and the assignee
(plaintiff) stood in the shoes of the assignor").

Moreover,

as an intended beneficiary of the assumption agreements, First
Interstate had the power to enforce the terms of the note
directly against Park Meadows.

Second Restatement of

Contracts § 304 (1979)("A promise in a contract creates a duty
in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the
promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty").
Accord, Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v, Dickamore, 652 P.2d
1314, 1315 (Utah 1982).

It is undisputed that Park Meadows
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did receive the notice called for in the note and,
consequently, the note was properly accelerated.
B.

The Beckers And Dougans Were Not Entitled
To Notice As Guarantors Of The Note

In addition to arguing improper acceleration, the
Beckers and Dougans asserted that their guaranty obligations
were discharged because First Interstate failed to provide
them with adequate notice of Park Meadow's default.
1160-1171.

This submission is unavailing.

R.

The Beckers' and

Dougans' guaranty was absolute and unconditional.

As such,

First Interstate was not obligated to provide them with notice
of Park Meadows' default.
(1941).

Restatement of Security § 136

The defendants' attempt to import a notice provision

into the guaranty (R. 1153-1160), moreover, is unpersuasive.
Indeed, numerous courts —

including the Utah Supreme Court —

have repeatedly rejected the precise argument proffered by the
Beckers and Dougans.

E.g., Corporation of the President v.

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah
1939) ; Western States Leasing Co. v. Adturn, Inc.. 500 P. 2d
1190, 1191 (Colo. App. 1972).
1.

Absent an express contractual notice
requirement, guarantors are not
entitled to notice of the principal
obligor's default

''All courts agree that if the contract of guaranty
affirmatively calls for notice, it is a condition which must
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be met in order to bind the guarantor on his promise."
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Black, 134 N.W.2d 481, 483
(Wis. 1965).

If the guaranty does not contain an express

notice requirement, however, the rule is exactly the contrary.
Unless notice is "required by the terms of the surety's
contract," a guarantor's "obligation to the creditor is not
affected by the creditor's failure to notify him of the
principal's default."

Restatement of Security, § 136.

Accord, Corporation of the President v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.. 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 1939)(sureties are "not
entitled to any notice of default unless the agreement
specifically provides therefore")(emphasis added); Waikiki
Seaside Inc. v. Comito. 641 P.2d 1363, 1364-1365 (Hawaii App.
1982)(a guarantor is entitled to notice only where required by
the terms of the guaranty).

The rationale for this rule is

set forth in Comment (a) to § 136 of the Restatement of
Security:
The rule stated in this Section is an
application of the usual rule of contracts that
an obligor is not discharged because he is not
notified that the time for his performance is
due, unless he has stipulated for notification.
The surety, when he undertakes his obligation,
must realize that there is a risk that the
principal will not perform. If the surety
wishes notification, he can insert a requirement
for it in his contract.
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This r u l e , and i t s supporting r a t i o n a l e , has been c o n s i s t e n t l y
a r t i c u l a t e d and applied by courts throughout the c o u n t r y . 9
The guaranty executed by the Beckers and Dougans does
not e x p l i c i t l y c a l l for notice t o the guarantors of the
principal obligor's default.

The guaranty, by i t s terms, does

not provide any condition precedent t o the o b l i g a t i o n of the

9

Lee v. Vaughn. 534 S.W.2d 221, 223-224 (Ark. 1976)(quoting Restatement
of Security § 136)("'the s u r e t y ' s o b l i g a t i o n to the c r e d i t o r i s not
a f f e c t e d by the c r e d i t o r ' s f a i l u r e to n o t i f y him of the p r i n c i p a l ' s
d e f a u l t u n l e s s such n o t i f i c a t i o n i s required by the terms of the
s u r e t y ' s contract'")(emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) ; Bowyer v. Clark Equipment
Co.. 357 N.E.2d 290, 293 (Ind. App. 1976)("a guarantor i s not e n t i t l e d
to n o t i c e of h i s p r i n c i p a l ' s d e f a u l t when h i s undertaking to answer for
h i s p r i n c i p a l ' s debts and o b l i g a t i o n s i s absolute 1 '); Dewey v. Henry's
Drive-Ins of Minnesota. I n c . . 222 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Minn. 1974)(quoting
Midway National Bank v. Gustafson. 165 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.
1968))("Our d e c i s i o n s do not support a holding that apart from contract
a [ c r e d i t o r ] has a duty to inform a guarantor of the [ p r i n c i p a l ' s ]
d e f a u l t . . . . '[T]he c r e d i t o r i s not obliged to look a f t e r the
i n t e r e s t s of the surety; o r d i n a r i l y , i t i s up to the surety to see to i t
that the p r i n c i p a l performs h i s duty'"); Orkin Exterminating Company
Inc. v. Stevens. 203 S.E.2d 587, 593 (Ga. App. 1 9 7 3 ) ( f a i l u r e to give
n o t i c e i s a defense only where contract expressly requires n o t i c e ) ;
Walker v. M i s s i s s i p p i Menhaden Products, I n c . . 136 So.2d 607, 609 (Miss.
1962)(an absolute guaranty "required no n o t i c e of d e f a u l t or demand");
American Tobacco Company v. Chalfen. 108 N.W.2d 702, 704-705 (Minn.
1961)(absolute guaranty requires no n o t i c e of d e f a u l t ) ; Bloom v. Bender.
313 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. 1957)(a guarantor's "contention that n o t i c e to
her of [the p r i n c i p a l ' s ] d e f a u l t in payment was a c o n d i t i o n precedent to
l i a b i l i t y i s without merit. Neither the law nor the subject agreement
requires such n o t i c e " ) ; Beach v. Beach. 107 A.2d 629, 633 (Conn.
1954)("The guarantee was unconditional and a b s o l u t e , and no n o t i c e of
d e f a u l t or demand was necessary"); In re B i t k e r ' s E s t a t e . 30 N.W.2d 449,
452 (Wis. 1947)("No n o t i c e of default in the performance of a contract
by the p r i n c i p a l party thereto i s necessary in order to hold the
guarantor to the c o n t r a c t " ) ; Rav v. Spencer. 208 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947)("The contract here being an unconditional or absolute
guarantee, no n o t i c e of the d e f a u l t was required to f a s t e n l i a b i l i t y on
t h i s guarantor"); Yama v. Sigman. 165 P.2d 191, 193 (Colo. 1945)(notice
of the p r i n c i p a l ' s d e f a u l t must be given to the guarantor where required
"by the express terms of the guaranty"); Robev v. Walton Lumber Co.. 135
P.2d 95, 102 (Wash. 1943)("In order to bind the guarantor under an
absolute guaranty i t i s not necessary that there should be . . . n o t i c e
of the d e f a u l t of the p r i n c i p a l " ) ( q u o t i n g 28 C.J. 895-896); Perry v.
Footnote continued on next page.
26

Beckers and Dougans other than default of the p r i n c i p a l
obligor.

The guaranty simply s t a t e s t h a t the guarantors

" j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y guarantee payment of t h i s Promissory
Note (Secured By Deed of Trust) and further guarantee payment
of the e n t i r e indebtedness evidenced thereby and the Deed of
Trust securing the s a m e /

Addendum B.

The guaranty,

t h e r e f o r e , i s unconditional and absolute.

Valley Bank & Trust

v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, I n c . , 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah
App. 1987), c e r t , denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988)("A
guaranty of the payment of an o b l i g a t i o n , without words of
l i m i t a t i o n or condition, i s construed as an absolute or
unconditional guaranty").

If the Beckers and Dougans

Footnote continued from previous page.
Cohen. 11 A.2d 804, 805 (Conn. 1940)(quoting City Savings Bank v.
Hopson. 5 A. 601, 602 (Conn. 1886))("'Upon non-payment at maturity i t
became, and has since continued to be, t h e i r [the guarantors'] duty to
go to the holder and pay i t , and t h i s without demand or n o t i c e . ' . . .
In such a case there i s no burden upon the holder of the note to do
anything as regards the guarantor, but the burden i s on the l a t t e r to
a s c e r t a i n the f a c t of nonpayment and take the necessary steps to protect
h i s other i n t e r e s t " ) .
10

Accord. Robev v. Walton Lumber Co.. 135 P.2d 95, 102 (Wash.
1943)(quoting Sherman. Clav & Co. v. Turner. 2 P.2d 688, 690 (Wash.
1931)(emphasis and e l l i p s i s in o r i g i n a l ) ( " ' A n absolute guaranty i s one
by which the guarantor unconditionally promises payment or performance
of the p r i n c i p a l contract on default of the p r i n c i p a l debtor or obligor,
the most usual form of an absolute guaranty being that of payment. * * *
A guaranty i s deemed to be absolute unless i t s terms import some
condition precedent to the l i a b i l i t y of the guarantor'"); Sherman. Clav
& Co. v. Turner. 2 P.2d 688, 689 (Wash. 1931)(a guaranty c o n s i s t i n g
simply of the words "Payment Guaranteed" c o n s t i t u t e s an absolute,
unconditional guaranty); Walker v. M i s s i s s i p p i Menhaden Products. I n c . .
136 So.2d 607, 608 (Miss. 1962)(contractual language that the
"Guarantor, w i l l and does hereby guarantee the f u l l performance and
f u l f i l l m e n t by the Boat Owner of a l l d u t i e s , o b l i g a t i o n s , and
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s imposed upon the Boat Owner by t h i s agreement" i s "an
absolute guaranty").
-
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desired notification, they should have inserted such a
stipulation into the guaranty before they executed it.
Corporation of the President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co,, 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 1939).

However, because their

unconditional guarantee does not call for notice of the
principal's default, the Beckers' and Dougans' obligations to
First Interstate are not affected by any "failure to notify
[them] of the principal's default."

Restatement of Security,

§136.
2.

Guarantors cannot create an express
right to notice by inference

In an attempt to avoid the plain import of the
foregoing authority, the Beckers and Dougans argued below that
an express notice provision could be imported into the
guaranty by reading it "together" with the terms of the note.
R. 1153-1160.
reasoning.

The district court apparently adopted this

R. 1415. An "express" right to notice, however,

cannot be "implied" into the terms of a guaranty.

Indeed, the

Beckers' and Dougans' submission is controverted by the very
rule of contract construction they invoke and has been
rejected by numerous courts —

including the Utah Supreme

Court•
First Interstate does not dispute that, as a general
rule, "[w]here two or more instruments are executed by the
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the
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course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject
matter, they will be read and construed together."

Big

Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1988)(emphasis added)(quoting Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz,
501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972)J.11

But, however well-

established the foregoing rule, it simply does not apply to
the construction of the guaranty at issue here.
To begin with, the note and guaranty were not
executed by the same parties.

Only PCRC, through its

president, signed the note, while the Beckers, Dougans and
Ayers individually signed the guaranty.

Nor does the guaranty

deal with the same subject matter as the note.

As a matter of

law, a guarantor — whose liability arises only in the event
of the principal's default —

assumes obligations wholly

independent of the maker of a note.
342 (Wash. 1965).

Amick v. Baucrh, 402 P.2d

Courts, therefore, are obliged to consider

a contract of guaranty and an underlying note as separate
obligations.

Component Systems v. Eight Judicial District

Court, 692 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Nev. 1985).

As the Washington

Supreme Court succinctly put it:
The debtor is not a party to the guaranty, and
the guarantor is not a party to the principal
obligation. The undertaking of the former is
11

See also First Security Bank of Utah v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078, 1080
(Utah 1983); Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah
1972); Verhoef v. Aston. 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987).
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independent of the promise of the l a t t e r ; and
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which are imposed by the
c o n t r a c t of guaranty d i f f e r from t h o s e which are
created by the contract t o which the guaranty i s
c o l l a t e r a l . The f a c t t h a t both c o n t r a c t s are
w r i t t e n on the same paper or instrument does not
a f f e c t the independence or separateness of the
one from the o t h e r .
Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 135 P.2d 95, 102 (Wash.
1943)(quoting 24 Am Jur. 875, 876 § 4 ) .
Because a contract of guaranty i s separate and
independent of the underlying o b l i g a t i o n , c o u r t s have
repeatedly refused t o accept the i d e n t i c a l argument propounded
by the Beckers and Dougans.

In Western S t a t e s Leasing Co. v.

Adturn. I n c . , 500 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Colo. App. 1972), the
guarantor of a d e f a u l t e d l e a s e agreement claimed t h a t the
l e s s o r ' s f a i l u r e t o n o t i f y him of the l e s s e e ' s d e f a u l t
r e l e a s e d him from h i s guaranty.

The guaranty at i s s u e , l i k e
12
the one in t h i s c a s e , was absolute in terms. " The l e a s e ,
however,

( l i k e the note here) provided for d e f a u l t n o t i c e t o

the l e s s e e .

Based on reasoning i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t proposed by

the Beckers and Dougans, the t r i a l court r e l e a s e d the

12

The guaranty provided:
"[Turner] does guaranty to s a i d Lessor, i t s successors and
a s s i g n s that any and a l l rent or rents which s h a l l become due
under the p r o v i s i o n s of the above described l e a s e s h a l l be
paid in f u l l when due, and the undersigned does hereby
acknowledge to be personally o b l i g a t e d to pay s a i d rents
together with i n t e r e s t thereon as s p e c i f i e d under the l e a s e at
the due date thereof."

guarantor from his obligation.

The Colorado Court of Appeals

reversed.
The reasoning of the court of appeals is directly
applicable to this case (500 P.2d at 1191):
[T]here is no basis for implying that timely
notice of default should have been given to [the
guarantor] before liability could be imposed
under the guaranty. Where a contract of
guaranty provides that notice of default of the
principal debtor must be given to the guarantor,
such notice must be given for the guarantor to
be liable. Yama v. Sigman. 114 Colo. 323, 165
P.2d 191. However, where an unambiguous,
absolute guaranty is silent as to notice and the
maximum amount guaranteed is determinable at the
time the guarantee [sic] is entered into, as in
the case at hand, there is no basis to imply a
requirement of notice.
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court
erred by "resort[ing] to the language of the lease to construe
the guaranty as to any limiting conditions."

500 P.2d at

1191.
Other courts, on analogous facts, have reached the
same conclusion as the court in Western States Leasing.

Robey

v. Walton Lumber Co.. 135 P.2d 95, 102-103 (Wash. 1943)(a
guarantor is not entitled to incorporate into his guaranty the
contractual provisions of an underlying deed of trust —

even

though those provisions excuse performance by the primary
obligor; "We are satisfied, as stated, that at the time this
action was brought, the principal obligor was in default in
the payment of principal and interest due on the bonds, and it
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appearing that Clyde Walton had unconditionally guaranteed the
payment of the principal and interest on the bonds when due,
these respondents are not prohibited from bringing this action
on the guaranty, regardless of their inability to proceed
against the principal obligor"); Mortgage & Contract Co, v.
Linenberg. 244 N.W. 428, 430-432 (Mich. 1932)(guarantor of a
land purchase contract is obligated to perform under her
guaranty even though she did not receive notice that the debt
had been accelerated against the primary obligor; "Mrs.
Obenauer's guaranty that the vendee would 'faithfully perform
said contract' included payment under this acceleration clause
just as much as it included payment of the monthly
installments" and *[i]f Mrs. Obenauer desired notice of the
vendee's default as a condition precedent to her being held
liable under the acceleration clause or as a condition
precedent to suit on her guaranty, it should have been so
provided in the contract of guaranty itself").
The result reached by the above courts is mandated
here.

The guaranty executed by the Beckers and Dougans is

absolute and unambiguous.

This Court, therefore, may not use

a notice provision in favor of the maker of the note to imply
a notice provision in favor of the guarantors.

Any doubts

regarding the propriety of this result are dispelled by the
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Corporation of the
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President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 95 P.2d 736,
745 (Utah 1939).
In Corporation of the President, the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints sued a surety on a contractor's
bond based upon the contractor's failure to perform.

As in

this case, the church's contract with the primary obligor
required express notice of default to the primary obligor.
The surety bond, in turn, was silent on that issue.

As in

this case, therefore, the surety argued that the notice
provision in favor of the primary obligor required notice to
the surety of the primary obligor's default.

The Utah Supreme

Court rejected that assertion with language that requires
reversal of the district court (95 P.2d at 745):
The contract and bond do not provide for any
notice to the Surety. It is arguable that, in
view of such failure, there should be an
implication that notice to the [primary obligor]
was for the benefit of the Surety. But sureties
in building contracts are not entitled to any
notice of default unless the agreement
specifically provides therefore.
Guarantors are not entitled to notice of a
principal's default absent express stipulation to the
contrary.

Restatement of Security § 136; n. 9, supra.

is no such stipulation here.

There

Courts may not create express

notice provisions by incorporating the terms of the underlying
obligation into the guaranty.

Corporation of the President,

supra; Western States Leasing, supra; Robey v. Walton Lumber
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Co,, supra; Mortgage & Contract Co. v. Linenberg. supra.

The

Beckers and Dougans, therefore, were not entitled to advance
notice of Park Meadow's default prior to acceleration.
Finally, even if this Court were to refer to the note
in construing the guaranty, the note offers little comfort to
the Beckers and Dougans.

The 15-day cure period invoked by

the defendants applies to the maker of the note.

The only

express note provision that applies to "guarantors" provides
that the "guarantors . • . severally waive . . . notice of
nonpayment."

Addendum B.

As a result, reading the guaranty

"together" with the note is, in fact, fatal to the defendants'
position.

Waikiki Seaside Inc. v. Comito. 641 P.2d 1363, 1365

(Hawaii App. 1982)("In this case, the guaranty was absolute in
form and bound defendants without notice of their acceptance.
Notice of default is clearly waived; hence, there was no
requirement to give such notice").

Accordingly, the district

court's discharge of the Beckers' and Dougans' guaranty
obligations must be reversed.
C.

Even If The Beckers And Dougans Were
Entitled To Notice, Their Claimed Right To
Discharge Lacks Merit

Even if there existed a viable legal theory under
which the Beckers and Dougans as guarantors were entitled to
notice of their principal's default, failure to receive such
notice does not entitle them to absolute discharge.

The

Beckers' and Dougans' contrary submission, adopted without

-
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d i s c u s s i o n by the d i s t r i c t court (R, 1415-1416), ignores the
fundamental p r i n c i p l e that impairment of a s u r e t y ' s r i g h t s
does not "have the e f f e c t of discharging the surety
a l t o g e t h e r , but, rather, discharges him pro t a n t o , that i s , t o
the e x t e n t t o which he has been i n j u r e d , "
and Surety, § 159 at 298.

72 C^J.S. Principal

The record here unequivocally

e s t a b l i s h e s that the Beckers and Dougans could not have been
injured by the claimed lack of n o t i c e .
I t i s well e s t a b l i s h e d that f a i l u r e t o g i v e required
n o t i c e t o a surety r e s u l t s in discharge only t o the e x t e n t the
surety i s prejudiced by the omission.

S e c t i o n 137 of the

Restatement of Security provides t h a t , i f a surety i s e n t i t l e d
t o n o t i c e , "and i f such n o t i c e i s not g i v e n , the surety i s
discharged t o the e x t e n t of r e s u l t i n g p r e j u d i c e . " This rule
i s uniformly r e f l e c t e d in the decided c a s e s . 13 Application of
t h i s r u l e t o the Beckers and Dougans requires r e v e r s a l of the
d i s t r i c t court because, even assuming they were e n t i t l e d t o

13

Z i o n ' s F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank v. H u r s t . 570 P.2d 1031, 1033-1034 (Utah
1 9 7 7 ) ( f a i l u r e to give adequate n o t i c e r e l e a s e s a debtor t o the e x t e n t of
"any l o s s caused by the f a i l u r e to so n o t i f y " ) ; Corporation of the
P r e s i d e n t v . H a r t f o r d Accident & Indemnity Co.. 95 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah
1 9 3 9 ) ( f a i l u r e to comply with terms of a guaranty does not r e l e a s e the
guaranty a b s o l u t e l y "but only to the e x t e n t to which i t has been
p r e j u d i c e d or has s u f f e r e d damage by the non-compliance"); E l e c t r i c
Storage B a t t e r y Co. v . Black. 134 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Wis. 1 9 6 5 ) ( s u r e t y
d i s c h a r g e d only to e x t e n t t h a t delay i n n o t i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t s in
p r e j u d i c e ) ; P i a s e c k i v. F i d e l i t y Corp. of Michigan. 63 N.W.2d 671, 676
(Mich. 1954)(quoting Palmer v. Schrage. 242 N.W. 751 (Mich. 1 9 3 2 ) ) ( i f a
g u a r a n t o r i s e n t i t l e d to n o t i c e and " i f such n o t i c e was not given, and
defendants i n consequence t h e r e o f were damaged, they would be released
pro t a n t o from t h e i r guaranty").

-
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notice of Park Meadow's default, failure to receive that
notice did not result in cognizable injury.
The Beckers and Dougans could have been injured by
lack of notice only if they would have cured Park Meadow's
default within the 15-day cure period provided by the note.
To meet this burden of proof, Dougan asserts that he and
"Frederick G. Becker III were willing and able to cure the
default on the Racquet Club Note in the first months of 1986,
and would have done so if they had received timely notice of
the default."

R. 1198-1199.

however, is the fact that —

What this submission ignores,
even if First Interstate somehow

wrongfully deprived them of the 15-day cure period established
by the note —

the Beckers and Dougans nevertheless failed to

take advantage of a subsequent three-month statutory cure
period.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1) provides that, where a
debt secured by a deed of trust has been accelerated, "the
trustor or his successor in interest . . . or any other person
having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon
. . . at any time within three months of the filing for record
of notice of default under such trust deed, if the power of
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary . . . the
entire amount then due under the terms of such trust deed . .
. other than such portion of the principal as would not then
be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the default.

. . ."

Invocation of the three-month cure period established

by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 "suspends the right to sell under
the power of sale and has the effect of suspending application
of the acceleration clause if it was triggered by the
default."

I Summary of Utah Real Property Law 399-400 (J.

Reuben Clark Law School 1978).
On February 10; 1986, First Interstate executed a
statutory notice of default accelerating the sum payable under
the note.

This notice was recorded on February 14, 1986.

Accordingly, as guarantors of Park Meadow's obligations under
the deed of trust, the Beckers and Dougans had three months
from February 14, 1986 to cure Park Meadow's default by paying
the unaccelerated sums past due under the note.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 57-1-31(2)(cancellation of a notice of default can be
requested by "any person having an interest in the trust
property").

They did not do so and, as a result, any claim of

prejudice here is baseless.
The Beckers and Dougans admit that they received a
copy of the statutory notice of default shortly after February
21, 1986.

R. 1132-1133.

They have also asserted that they

"were willing and able to cure the default on the Racquet Club
Note in the first months of 1986." R. 1198.

But, no matter

how one defines the "first months of 1986" (id.), those months
would necessarily include all of February 1986. The Dougans
and Beckers, therefore, were not injured by the alleged lack
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of notice because, by their own admission, they could have
cured the default —
so —

if they in fact had been of a mind to do

for a three-month period following receipt of the notice

of default pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31.

The Beckers'

and Dougans' failure to cure Park Meadow's default during this
statutory cure period establishes beyond peradventure that
their "loss" of the 15-day contractual cure period did not
result in any actual prejudice: despite their assertions to
the contrary (R. 1198-1199), the guarantors obviously lacked
either the will or the ability to cure Park Meadow's default
at any time "during the first months of 1986."
III.

BECAUSE
OF LAW,
SUMMARY
BECKERS

Id.

THEIR DEFENSES ARE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
FIRST INTERSTATE IS ENTITLED TO PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF THE
AND DOUGANS

In addition to the notice arguments addressed above,
the Beckers and Dougans have asserted that First Interstate
discharged their guaranty obligations by "unjustifiably
impairing the collateral securing the note and by releasing"
one of the partners of Park Meadows, Enoch Smith.
These defenses, however, are devoid of merit.
these defenses —

R. 114.

Indeed, because

like the notice submissions —

are

insufficient as a matter of law, First Interstate is entitled
to partial summary judgment establishing the liability of the
Beckers and Dougans.

-™-

The claim that First Interstate released the Beckers
and Dougans by impairing the collateral securing the note is
without basis in fact or law.

It is undisputed that the

racquet club property was the only collateral securing the
note.

The entire proceeds from the sale of that property,

moreover, were applied to the note.

R. 756-757.

In these

circumstances, an impairment of collateral defense lacks any
foundation.
The defense based upon the purported release of a
Park Meadows partner is likewise chimerical.

This defense is

based entirely upon paragraph five of the loan work-out
agreement executed between Park Meadows, First Interstate, and
First Security.

Addendum C.

That paragraph provides that

Enoch Smith, a partner of Park Meadows "will be released from
whatever personal liability may exist on the FSB [First
Security] debt, FIUT's [First Interstate's] PMD [Park
Meadows], Enoch Smith Co. and Smith Park Acres Loans and the
dyers' loan."

Addendum C, 1 5 .

The only wording in this

paragraph that even arguably relates to a release under the
note is the language referring to "FIUT's PMD . . . loan."
Id. 14 First Interstate contends that this language does not

14

The Enoch Smith Co., Smith Park Acres and "Ayers" loans clearly do not
refer to the note.
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r e f e r t o the n o t e .

But, even assuming t h a t paragraph f i v e

does r e f e r t o the note, paragraph f i v e does not — as a matter
of law — r e l e a s e the guarantors of the note from l i a b i l i t y .
To begin with, the r e l e a s e of a partner does not
r e l e a s e e i t h e r the partnership or the guarantors of the
p a r t n e r s h i p ' s debt.

Under Utah law, partnerships are separate

e n t i t i e s from the p a r t n e r s .

For example, while a partner has

an equal r i g h t with h i s partners t o p o s s e s s

specific

partnership property for partnership purposes, a partner has
no r i g h t t o p o s s e s s such property for other purposes.
Code Ann. § 4 8 - 1 - 2 2 ( 2 ) ( a )

(1989).

Utah

Partnership a s s e t s a l s o

cannot be used t o s a t i s f y an i n d i v i d u a l p a r t n e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n s
without a charging order.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-25

(1989).

S i m i l a r l y , although partners are l i a b l e for partnership debts,
the a s s e t s of the partnership must f i r s t be exhausted before
c r e d i t o r s can reach the i n d i v i d u a l a s s e t s of the partner.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1989).

Consequently, the r e l e a s e of

a partner does not r e l e a s e the partnership and — without
r e l e a s e of the partnership — any claimed b a s i s for r e l e a s e of
the p a r t n e r s h i p ' s guarantors disappears.

15

At the time the work-out agreement was executed, Park Meadows owed F i r s t
I n t e r s t a t e on two secured and three unsecured loans r e l a t e d to the
development of the Park Meadows g o l f course. These loans were the "PMD
. . . loans" referred to in paragraph f i v e .
Indeed, these loans -- but
not the note -- were subsequently r e l e a s e d by separate documents
implementing the terms of the work-out agreement. R. 787-795.

But, even i f r e l e a s e of a partner could somehow be
construed as a r e l e a s e of the partnership, any defense based
on the work-out agreement i s s t i l l l e g a l l y d e f i c i e n t because
paragraph f i v e does not c o n s t i t u t e a present r e l e a s e of
anyone.

Paragraph f i v e s t a t e s t h a t Enoch Smith "will be

released" (Addendum C 5 5)(emphasis added); i t does not
provide t h a t Smith " i s hereby released" — wording t h a t would
be expected i f paragraph f i v e e f f e c t e d a present r e l e a s e .
Indeed, paragraph f i v e of the agreement i s no more a r e l e a s e
of Enoch Smith than paragraph four i s a blanket mortgage or
paragraph two a $1 m i l l i o n loan.

Moreover, the agreement

e x p r e s s l y provides t h a t i t s terms, including paragraph f i v e ,
w i l l be implemented * [ a ] t the contemplated c l o s i n g . "
C % 1.

Addendum

In f a c t , one of the partners of Park Meadows who

n e g o t i a t e d the work-out agreement characterized the agreement
as "just an o u t l i n e . "

Deposition of Enoch Richard Smith, Vol.

1 at 115.
As such, the work-out agreement merged with and was
superseded by the c l o s i n g documents t h a t gave e f f e c t t o i t s
provisions.

And, while t h e s e c l o s i n g documents did l i m i t

16

National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Bros.. I n c . . 29 Utah 2d 460, 511
P.2d 731, 733 (1973)("where p a r t i e s engage in n e g o t i a t i o n s concerning a
transaction, pursuant to which they enter into a w r i t t e n contract, i t i s
presumed that a l l matters r e l a t i n g to the subject are merged in and
c o n s t i t u t e a complete i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e i r agreement"); Mawhinnev v.
Jensen. 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769, 774 (1951)(a f i n a l contract
represents "the f i n a l meeting of the minds, and in i t are merged a l l the
terms expressing the f i n a l i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s and any
augmentations. If there are i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s between the terms of the
Footnote continued on next page.
-
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First Interstate's recourse against Enoch Smith and Margaret
Smith on certain specified loans, the racquet club note was
not included among those enumerated loans,
Addendum D at % 1, attached.

R. 782, 787-788,

Thus, because the only release

that was actually effectuated did not apply to the note
guaranteed by the Beckers and Dougans, their "release" defense
fails as a matter of law.
Finally, even assuming (contrary to the above) that
release of a partner releases the partnership and that First
Interstate effected a present release of Park Meadows, the
Beckers and Dougans would not be discharged from their
guaranty because they have been fully indemnified by the
partners of Park Meadows.

"In the few cases that have arisen,

it has been held that a release of the principal does not
discharge a surety if he is indemnified."

L. Simpson,

Handbook on the Law of Suretyship 304 (1950).

Accord, F.

Childs, Law of Surety and Guaranty 251 (1907)("If the surety
be fully indemnified, the rule [that a release of the
principal will discharge the surety] does not apply, as the
surety in such a case occupies the position of a principal,
and cannot be injured by the principal's release").

This rule

Footnote continued from previous page.
preliminary and final contracts, those of the latter will ordinarily
govern"); Beck v. Megli. 153 Kan. 721, 114 P.2d 305, 309 (1941)(a
memorandum agreement to lease and purchase a mill merged into a contract
that was executed several days later because the contract set out in
detail the terms of the lease and purchase).
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—

founded upon common-sense recognition of the fact that an

indemnified surety is not harmed by release of the principal
because the surety still has recourse against the principal on
the indemnification (id,) —

absolutely precludes the Beckers'

and Dougans' invocation of any defense based upon a purported
release of Park Meadows or its partners.
Dougan and Becker chose to exchange their interest in
the racquet club with Park Meadows.
novation.

They did not obtain a

Consequently, they knew that they remained liable

on their guaranty of the racquet club note.

To protect

themselves from this liability, they obtained a full indemnity
from Park Meadows and its individual partners.

Dougan and

Becker knew that, if Park Meadows did not perform, they would
have to pay the note and attempt to collect from Park Meadows
and its partners.
today.

This is precisely the position they occupy

Park Meadows has not performed on the note.

Therefore, regardless of any purported "release" of Park
Meadows, the Dougans and Beckers remain liable on the guaranty
and must look to Park Meadows and its partners on their
indemnity.

17

See R. 1182. The indemnity agreement executed by Park Meadows and its
partners as individuals on August 31, 1981 provided that Park Meadows
would "indemnify and hold harmless J. Lynn Dougan and Frederick G.
Becker II with regard to any and all obligations, damages or claims with
regard to a certain Promissory Note dated December 11, 1978 in the
amount of $800,000 secured by Deed of Trust covering property known as
the Park City Racquet Club." R. 1182.
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IV.

THE DEPOSITION EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE BECKERS
AND DOUGANS CANNOT BE RECOVERED AS "COSTS" UNDER
RULE 54(d)(2), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

authorizes a prevailing party to recover certain costs
(including filing fees and stenographic costs) so long as "the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding."

After prevailing on their summary judgment

motion, the district court awarded the Beckers and Dougans the
costs incurred in taking 12 depositions —

even though those

depositions were not necessary to (or even used in support of)
their motion.

If this Court reverses the lower court's

judgment, it will not be necessary to address the propriety of
this award.

If this Court affirms, however, the award of

costs entered below should be reversed.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
costs for the taking of depositions will not be awarded unless
they are "essential for the development and presentation of
the case" fHiahland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984)), and are actually used
at trial.

Nelson v. Newman. 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah 1978).

In Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
decision not to award costs for the taking of depositions
which were not used during the trial and which defendants
failed to demonstrate were necessary to the preparation of
their case.

Id.
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Although several of the depositions for which the
Beckers and Dougans were awarded costs involved issues totally
18

unrelated t o the o r i g i n a l issuance of the note,

the bulk of

the d e p o s i t i o n s were taken of i n d i v i d u a l s who were involved
with e i t h e r the n e g o t i a t i o n , execution or administration of
the n o t e .

R. 1457-1459.

For t h i s reason, the Beckers and

Dougans can accurately claim t h a t the d e p o s i t i o n s had some
general "relevance" t o t h e i r c a s e .
not enough.

But general "relevance" i s

To recover on the 12 d e p o s i t i o n s , they must

e s t a b l i s h t h a t the discovery for which they seek reimbursement
was necessary or e s s e n t i a l t o t h e i r summary judgment motion.
Rule 5 4 ( d ) ( 2 ) ; Highland Construction Co., supra; Nelson v.
Newman, supra.

That showing cannot be made here.

The Beckers and Dougans p r e v a i l e d below on an
exceedingly narrow c l u s t e r of i s s u e s :

whether F i r s t

I n t e r s t a t e gave proper n o t i c e of i t s i n t e n t t o a c c e l e r a t e ,
whether F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e erred in g i v i n g t h a t n o t i c e t o Park
Meadows rather than PCRC, and whether F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e erred
by not g i v i n g n o t i c e of d e f a u l t t o the Beckers and Dougans.
Their motion did not r e l y whatsoever on the 12 d e p o s i t i o n s for

18

One of the d e p o s i t i o n s , that of Douglas Matsumori, involved an attorney
who represented F i r s t Security Bank in loan work-out n e g o t i a t i o n s with
Park Meadows. Mr. Matsumori, as a representative of a party adverse to
F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e , obviously had a b s o l u t e l y no involvement in drafting or
a c c e l e r a t i n g the note at i s s u e here. At l e a s t two other depositions
(Wayne Grey Petty, Mark D. Howell) a l s o d e a l t primarily with loan workout d i s c u s s i o n s unrelated to the execution or a c c e l e r a t i o n of the note.
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which they were awarded costs.

As the pleadings filed in

support of their motion demonstrate, the Beckers' and Dougans'
motion was based solely on the language of the note — a
document that has been available to them since the
commencement of this action —
exclusively for the motion.

and affidavits prepared

R. 1124-1202; 1302-1351.

The

arguments found dispositive below, therefore, were available
to the defendants since the commencement of this action.

The

Beckers and Dougans are not entitled to recover costs relating
to the development of other aspects of the case simply because
they chose to postpone raising their "notice'1' arguments.
CONCLUSION
The Beckers and Dougans executed an absolute and
unconditional guaranty in favor of a predecessor of First
Interstate in order to secure financing of a venture
controlled by them.

That venture turned sour, resulting in

significant losses.

The Beckers and Dougans, by means of the

technical defenses and arguments discussed above, have
attempted to shift those losses from their own shoulders onto
the backs of First Interstate and its shareholders.
Court should not countenance such a result.
defenses raised by the Beckers and Dougans —

This

None of the
whether based on

a claimed lack of notice, impairment of collateral, or release
of Park Meadows —

have any legal merit.

Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the
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Court should enter partial summary judgment in favor of First
Interstate establishing the Beckers' and Dougans' liability as
guarantors.

The Court should then remand this case for

determination of the final amount due under the note.
Respectfully submitted,
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN

' (JisiA4.(Lmitf Cooor/
Mar/AnweQ. Wood
Ricriie \y. Haddock
Richard G. Wilkins
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant First Interstate
Bank
NOVEMBER 22, 1989
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (1986) provides:
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal
sum of any obligation secured by a trust deed
has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such
obligation, become due or been declared due by
reason of a breach or default in the performance
of any obligation secured by the trust deed,
including a default in the payment of interest
or of any installment of principal, or by reason
of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance
with the terms of the trust deed, taxes,
assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances
made by the beneficiary in accordance with terms
of such obligation or of such trust deed, the
trustor or his successor in interest in the
trust property or any part thereof or any other
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance
of record thereon or any beneficiary under a
subordinate trust deed, at any time within three
months of the filing for record of notice of
default under such trust deed, if the power of
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the
beneficiary or his successor in interest the
entire amount then due under the terms of such
trust deed (including costs and expenses
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such
obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and
attorney's fees actually incurred) other than
such portion of the principal as would not then
be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure
the default theretofore existing and, thereupon,
all proceedings theretofore had or instituted
shall be dismissed or discontinued and the
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated
and shall be and remain in force and effect the
same as if no such acceleration had occurred.
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed
reinstated in the manner provided in Subsection (1), the
beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of any
person having an interest in the trust property, execute
and deliver to him a request to the trustee to execute
and deliver to him a request to the trustee to execute,
acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the recorded

- 48 -

notice of default under such trust deed; and any
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for
a period of 3 0 days after such demand, refuses to request
the trustee to execute and deliver such cancellation is
liable to the person entitled to such request for all
damages resulting from such refusal• A release and
reconveyance given by the trustee or beneficiary, or
both, or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a
cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a
cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a
trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded
and is sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in
substantially the following form: [form for Cancellation
of Notice of Default omitted].
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides:
The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and
file with the court a like memorandum thereof
duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in
the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied
with the costs claimed may, within seven days
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the
court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict,
or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is
entered.
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ADDENDUM B

PPOMISSORY NOTE
(SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST)
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises and agrees to
pay to the order of WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY (hereinafter termed
"Walker") or its assigns, at the main office of Walker, Salt Lake
City, Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may
designate in writing, the principal sum of Eight Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($800,000.00) in lawful money of the United States of
America, together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at
the rata of eleven percent (11%) per annum until paid. Principal
and interest shall be paid in equal monthly installments of Seven
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-One Dollars ($7,341.00) each commencing with a payment on the 1st day of January, 1979, and
continuing with a like payment on the first day of each succeeding
calendar month thereafter until the entire remaining unpaid balance
of principal and interest has been paid in full; provided, however,
that the 'final payment hereunder shall be in an amount equal to
the then remaining unpaid balance. Installments shall be applied
first toward the payment and satisfaction of accrued and unpaid
interest and the remainder shall be applied toward the reduction
of principal. Interest for each monthly payment and period shall
be computed on a 360-day year basis. Interest, if any, which
accrues during the period commencing with the date of this Note
and ending prior to the date of the first installment due hereunder shall be deducted from the proceeds of the loan evidenced
hereby.
The undersigned shall have the option to prepay all or any
portion of the unpaid principal balance of the Mote in any one
(1) year without penalty. In the event the undersigned shall
exercise such option, the same shall not relieve the undersigned
nor waive any obligation of the undersigned to make timely monthly
installment payments thereafter maturing. Walker or its assigns
shall, at any time following the expiration of ten (10) years
from and after the date of execution hereof, at any time during
the remainder of the term hereof have the sole and exclusive option
to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable upon giving
to the undersigned sixty (60) days notice in writing of its intent
to declare the same due and payable.
The undersigned further agrees to pay to Walker or its assigr.i
at the sole and exclusive option of Walker or its assigns, budget
payments on a monthly basis in addition to principal and interest
as hereinabove set forth. Such budget payments shall be in an
amount equal to one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual real property
taxes and casualty insurance premiums on the real property and
improvements described in the Deed of Trust securing this Note
and with respect thereto, the undersigned further acknowledges and
agrees that neither Walker nor its assigns is obligated to pay and
the undersigned specifically waives any claim to the payment of
interest, earnings or other sums or amounts by Walker or its
assigns on such budget payments. Neither Walker nor its assigns
shall pay interest or earnings on any ether sums or amounts
held for"the benefit of or deposited by the undersigned in
connection with this Note or the Deed of Trust securing the san.e.

In the avent of the exercise of said option, walker«or its
assigns shall give to the undersigned thirty (30} days notice
in writing of its intent to require payment by the undersigned
of said budget payments.
In the event any installment or payment (including an instal
ment or payment with respect to which the late charge provided fc
in this Paragraph has previously been imposed) provided to be mad
hereunder, or under any instrument given to secure the payment of
the obligation evidenced hereby, has not been paid in full on or
before the fifteenth (15th) day of any month the same is due as
provided herein, the holder hereof shall have the right to demand
of and receive from the undersigned a late charge equal to four
percent (4%) of the entirety of such installment or payment.
In the event: (a) any installment provided for hereunder i
not paid in full within fifteen (15) days*after its scheduled due
date; or (b) the undersigned defaults in the performance of any
covenant or promise contained herein or in any instrument given
to secure the payment of the obligations evidenced hereby; or (c)
a petition is filed seeking that any of the undersigned or any
general partner in any of the undersigned be adjudged a bankrupt;
or (d) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of th
undersigned makes a general assignment for the benefit of credito
or (e) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of th
undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (f) any of
the undersigned or any general partner in any of the undersigned
becomes insolvent; or (g) any of the undersigned or any general
partner in any of the undersigned undergoes liquidation, termination, or dissolution, then, in any of such events and upon
fifteen (15) days written notice given to the undersigned by
Walker or its assigns which default or event shall not be cured
by the undersigned within fifteen (15) days following such writte
notice, the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal
and interest owing hereunder shall, at the option of the holder
hereof and without notice or demand, become immediately due and
payable. Thereafter, said unpaid balance, including interest,
shall, until paid and both before and after judgment, earn intere
at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum. As used herein,
written notice shall be effective as of the time the same is deposited in the United Sataes Mails addressed to the last known
address of the undersigned or the time of the actual receipt
thereof, if earlier. The acceptance of any installment or payment after the occurrence of a default or event giving rise to
the right of acceleration provided for in this Paragraph shall
not constitute a waiver of such right of acceleration with respec
to such default or event or any subsequent default or event.
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, or any
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under any instru
ment given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is not satis
fied or performed, at the time and in the manner required, the
undersigned agrees to pay any and all costs and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether or not incurred
in conjunction with litigation, before or after judgment, or in
connection with exercise of power of sale provided for in the
Deed of Trust securing this Note) which may be incurred by the
holder hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its
rights under this Note or under any such other instrument, ir.clud
court costs and reasonable Trustee's and Attorney's fees.
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Mote
or in any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced her
(i) the rates of interest, charges and penalties provided for
herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates, charges,
and penalties which result in interest being charged at a rate
equaling the maximum allowed by law; and (ii) if, for any reason
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whatsoever, th~ holder hereof ever r e c e i v e as interest in connection with the transaction of which this Mote is a part an amount
which would result in interest being charged at a rate exceeding
the maximum allowed by law, such amount or portion thereof as
would otherwise be excessive interest shall automatically be appii
toward reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding
hereunder and not toward payment of interest.
The makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice
of protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of nonpayment, and expressly agree that this Note, or any payment hereunder, mav be
extended from time to time by the holder hereof without in*any
way affecting the liability of such parties. This Note shall be
the joint and several obligation of all makers, sureties,
guarantors and endorsers and shall be binding upon their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns".
In the event any of the undersigned is a partnership or
corporation, each person executing this instrument on behalf of
such entity individually and personally represents and warrants
that this Note and each instrument signed in the name of such
entity and delivered to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is
in all respects binding upon such entity as an act and obligation
of said partnership or corporation.
This Note and the Deed of Trust securing the same shall be
fully and freely assignable in whole or in part by Walker cr its
assigns as they shall deem advisable without notice to the undersigned.
This Note is given in consideration of a loan made by Walker
to the undersigned for business purposes and not personal", family,
household, or agricultural purposes and is principally secured by
a Deed of Trust covering real property situated in Summit County*
State of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in*
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
DATED this

day of

, 1973.

ATTEST:

PARK CITY RACQUET CLUB, a Utah
corporation

'
Secretary

3y
President

.

For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficie:
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and
severally guarantee payment of this Promissory Note (Secured by
Deed of Trust) and further guarantee payment of the entire indebte:
ness evidenced thereby and the Deed of Trust securing the same.

FREDERICK G. 3ECKER

± *. i

Individ;ial!

MARGARET M. 3ECXER, Ind ividua-1;

VICTOR R. AYERS, Indivi dually

MARION P. AYERS, Individually

015781
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DIANA LADY DOUGAN, Individually
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

On the
day oj ^_. - /' ,-,'
1978, personally
appeared before me, '~ c •- -•- and
.'-.-"•- who being by me first duly sworn, did say that -r.ey
the President and Secretary, respectively, of PARK CITY RACQUET
CLUB, and the foregoing instrument was signed on behalf of said
corporation by authority of_a Resolution of its Board of Directs
or its By-laws, and said
.
- ~_
and
-- -•* ..
acknowledged to me that said corporation
executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

On the
• . day of .,-'-. -^ .. ~
, 1973, personally
appeared before me FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, MARGARET M. BECKER,
VICTOR R- AYERS, MARION P. -XYERS, J. LYNN DOUGAN and DIANA LADY
DOUGAN, the signers above named, who being by me first duly
sworn acknowledged to me that they executed the within and foregoing instrument.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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ADDENDUM C

PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED ENTITIES:
WORKOUT ARRANGEMENT WITH FIUT AND FSB
1.

At the contemplated closing, interest in the approximate sum
of $600,000, will be brought current on all loans of both
Banks to Park Meadows Development and related entities. The
source of funds will be $200,000 from the Smiths and loans
proceeds from FSB, if approved.

2.

Mark Howell will seek FSB approval of a loan to PMD in the
maximum sum of $1,000,000 to be utilized to pay the balance
of accrued interest, general claimants ($164,000), and Jack
Nicklaus ($13,900), and to provide working capital needs in
the future. Such future draws will be permitted only after
submission and approval of detailed budgets and/or invoices
to both banks. PMD will provide notification of actual
expenditures to both banks. Such loan shall be secured by
a first priority lien (by reason of subordination) on all
properties subject to the blanket mortgage mentioned in
paragraph 4 hereafter (except for First Federal's trust deeds).

3.

PMD will be allowed to pay the $300,000 debt to Enoch Smith
Sons Company out of lot sale proceeds at the rate of 5 percent
of such proceeds. This will require total sales of
$6,000,000.

4.

A blanket mortgage for the benefit of FSB and FIUT will be
placed on all of Park Meadows properties (exclusive of Park
Meadows Mountain), and the assets of Enoch and Dick Smith.
This mortgage will not disturb the first trust deeds of First
Federal or FSB as to Gleneagles and Lot 1765, but will cover
any equity in those properties. Said mortgage will exclude
the following assets of Enoch and Margaret Smith: Their home,
two cars, Country Club membership/ $250,000 in cash, $184,000
worth of securities to be identified, two stud horses, life
insurance, and Enoch Smith Sons Company and its assets. Also
excluded are the real property where Enoch Smith Sons Company
is located and all other stock in that company. Enoch Smith
Sons Company will remain liable to FIUT on the $500,000 loan.
The blanket mortgage will secure all debt of PMD to FSB and
FIUT, and also the debts to FIUT of Smith Park Acres Ranch,
Enoch Smith Company, Weaver Quality Welding, and the "Ayers*
loan. The "Ayers" loan will cease to be an obligation of
Enoch Smith Sons Co.

5.

Enoch and Margaret Smith will be released from whatever
personal liability may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD,
Enoch Smith Co. and Smith Park Acres loans and the "Ayers"
loan. Enoch Smith will retain whatever liability he now has

991ft

on the $500,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company loan, Dick Smith
will not have personal liability on the "Ayers* debt.
The Enoch Smith Sons Company $500,000 loan will be repayable
by quarterly interest only payments for one year with a due
date in one year at a rate of FIUT's prime rate plus %% and
prime rate plus 2%% after default. It will be renewable on
the same terms for an additional year if no default exists.
Smiths to provide Banks with budgets acceptable to banks and
schedule of price listings for lots, including variables for
bulk sales, for Banks" approval. If parties can't agree with
respect to prices, the parties agree to select a mutually
acceptable third party to set prices, considering current
market and need to sell within a relatively short period of
time.
Sales proceeds to be allocated as follows after payment of
commissions: Allowed first trust deeds release prices where
applicable (First Federal and First Security's Gleneagles, and
lot 1765); some allowance for working capital needs; balance
to FIUT and FSB for their agreed pro rata distribution.
Pro rata distribution with FIUT and FSB: Straight pro rata
based on relative total debt for accrued interest (exclusive
of "Ayers" debt): Principal reductions to pay off FSB first,
including the loan under paragraph 2 above, then remainder to
FIUT. Essentially, FIUT subordinates to FSB. The order of
payment of FIUT's loans secured by the blanket mortgage will
be as follows: $100,000 loan to Enoch Smith Co.; $250,000
loan to Smith Park Acres Ranch; $150,000 loan to Weavers
Quality Welding; loans to Park Meadows Investments; "Ayers*
loan. In the event that the Kentucky ranch is sold, the
proceeds will be applied to the extent necessary to pay the
Smith Park Acres loan, with any excess to be considered
proceeds of the blanket mortgage. If assets of Weavers
Quality Welding are sold, the net proceeds will be applied to
that company's loan.
Require retention of professional sales or project manager
either initially or if performance falters.
Banks to be informed of any and all offers, firm or tentative,
to purchase lots, parcels, the whole project, etc.
Banks will use best efforts to satisfy obligations out of
collateral other than Park City ranch.
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Dismissal of FSB's pending foreclosure action and press
release of same.
Enoch and Dick Smith will subordinate their right as partners
of Park Meadows Investment to receive proceeds from Park
Meadows Mountain to FIUT's "Ayers" loan.
All of the loans to be secured by the blanket mortgage and the
new loan which is provided in paragragh 2 above shall be 18
month term loans, with interest payable on a quarterly basis
commencing September 1, 1985, interest accruing at the rate of
%% above the prime rate of the respective banks. Interest on
H
AyersH loan to be deferred to maturity date. Loan
documentation shall include the agreement and obligation of
Park Meadows Development and the Borrowers to meet agreed
upon dollar volumes of property sales from the Park Meadows
project by agreed upon guideline dates. A failure to meet
those goals will constitute a default under the terms of the
loan documentation, provided however, that a reasonable period
(to be hereafter determined in the reasonable discretion of
the Banks) will be allowed for cure and reinstatement. Cure
and reinstatement will be conditioned upon evidence,
satisfactory to FSB and FIUT that the sales required for
satisfaction of the goals are immediately forthcoming or that
they, in fact, have occurred; and, further, upon reasonable
satisfaction of FSB and FIUT that the reasons for the failure
to meet the goals are not to continue or result in any
substantial likelihood of further defaults and failures. FSB
and FIUT will agree that an additional 18 month term will be
granted so long as the aforesaid sales goals are being met and
no other defaults exist under the loan documents. In this
connection, it is agreed that, net of amounts due to First
Federal on properties on which it maintains 1st priority
encumbrances, all sale proceeds shall be applied as set forth
in the paragraphs above.
If default occurs and is not cured as provided in paragraph 15
above, interest will accrue at the rate of 2%% above the
respective prime rates of the respective banks.
Agreed to this 19th day of June, 1985.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A.

Richard Smith - for(^
Park Meadows Investment
fka Park Meadows Development
Enoch Smith Sons Company
Enoch Smith Co.
:k

FIRST INTERSTATE BANK
UTAH, N.A.-

By:

0354M
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ADDENDUM D
AMENDMENT AND EXTENSION AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into, effective as of June
28, 1985, by and among PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. (formerly
known as Park Meadows Development Co.), a Utah Partnership;
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH; ENOCH SMITH, JR.; MARGARET SMITH; ENOCH
SMITH CO., a Utah Corporation; ENOCH SMITH SONS CO., a Utah
Corporation; WEAVER'S QUALITY WELDING, a Utah Corporation
(all hereinafter collectively referred to as ''Borrowers")
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A. (hereinafter referred to as "First Interstate").
RECITALS
1. First Interstate has previously extended the
following loans to one or more of Borrowers, some of which
are personally guaranteed by one or more of Borrowers:
a. A loan to Park Meadows Investment Co. with a
principal balance of $3,125,000.00 evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated August 29, 1983, secured by
various Trust Deeds.
b. A loan to Park Meadows Investment Co. with a
principal balance of $1,286,000.00 evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated August 29, 1983, secured by
various Trust Deeds.
c. An unsecured loan to Park Meadows Investment
Co. in the principal sum of $615,351.01 evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated December 2, 1984.
d. An unsecured loan to Park Meadows Investment
Co. in the principal sum of $149,973.99 evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated December 31, 1984.
e. An unsecured loan to Park Meadows Investment
Co. in the principal sum of $149,074.59 evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated February 28, 1985.
f. A loan to Enoch Smith Sons Co. with a principal balance of $3,961,875.66 evidenced by a Promissory Note dated August 29, 1983, secured by an
assignment of 23.5 percent interest in Park Meadows
Investment Co. (the "Partnership Note11).
g. An unsecured loan to Enoch Smith Company with
a principal balance of $100,000 evidenced by a Promissory Note dated February 28, 1985.
h. An unsecured loan to Enoch Smith, Jr., d/b/a
Smith Park Acres Ranch with a principal balance

of $250,000 evidenced by a Promissory Note dated
February 28, 1985.
i. An unsecured loan to Weaver Quality Welding
with a principal balance of $150,000 evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated February 28, 1985.
(Referred to collectively herein as the "Notes").
2. In connection with negotiations surrounding the
aforesaid loans and the obligations of Borrowers on other
loans, some of which are in default, certain accommodations
have been agreed to by First Interstate in exchange for
certain additional consideration (including the granting of
additional collateral and certain accommodations by and
arrangements with First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., hereinafter referred to as "First Security").
3. Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated agreements
among Borrowers, First Security and First Interstate,
extension of the maturity of the above described loans and
amendment to the payment and interest terms are to be
accomplished.
AGREEMENT
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and
as required under the terms of other agreements executed on
the effective date of this Agreement, and in consideration
of the mutual covenants, promises and agreements hereinafter
set forth, it is agreed by and among the parties as follows:
1. Extension of maturity date. The maturity date of
the Notes is hereby amended and extended to be December 31,
1986, at which time all outstanding and unpaid principal,
along with all accrued and unpaid interest and other
charges, fees and obligations payable in connection with the
same shall be due and payable, in full.
2. Revision of interest rate. The interest rates
applicable to the notes are hereby amended to provide that
interest, from and after June 30, 1985 shall accrue at the
rate of one-half percent (.5Z) above the Prime Rate of First
Interstate as announced and as changed from time to time.
First Interstate may make loans at, above, or below its
Prime Rate. After the date of any default or event of
default under the Notes or this Agreement, the rate of
interest rate per annum shall be two and one-half percent
(2.5Z) above First Interstate's Prime Rate until such
default shall be cured or payment in full made.
3. Revision of payment terms. Interest payments on
the Notes except the Partnership Note shall be payable on

the first day of each calendar quarter commencing on October
1, 1985, until paid in full. Mandatory prepayments of the
principal amount outstanding under the Notes shall be made
in accordance with the terms of that certain MPark Meadows
Development and Related Entities: Workout Arrangement with
FIUT and FSB", dated June 19, 1985 (the "Arrangement
Agreement11), as sales of the properties securing the Notes
are made and as provided in paragraph 5 below. Accrued
interest on the Partnership Note shall be payable in full at
maturity.
4. Cross default
Notes, the Trust Deeds
securing the Notes, or
default or an event of

provisions. Any default under the
or Supplemental Security Agreement
this Agreement shall constitute
default under the others.

5. Principal payments. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A11
and incorporated herein, is a Project Marketing Schedule,
which sets forth a schedule of gross sales volume to be
accomplished by Borrowers of property which is part of Park
Meadows and which serves as collateral for the Notes (such
property hereinafter referred to as the "Project11) . The
Project marketing schedule sets out specific periods of time
within which certain gross dollar volumes of sales of the
Project are required. Each such period is referred to
hereinafter as a "Marketing Period". Subject to the allowances provided hereinafter, for payment of budgeted
operating expenses, the ordinary costs of sale, and satisfaction and payment of release prices on First Federal
Savings and Loan priority Trust Deeds release prices and
certain priority Trust Deeds of First Security referred to
in the Arrangement Agreement, the following is required:
a. All proceeds of any of the collateral security
for the Notes and for the obligations of Borrower to
First Security referred to in the Arrangement Agreement
shall be paid over to First Security and disbursed by
First Security in accordance with the provisions of
that certain Intercreditor Agreement dated June 28,
1985 between First Security and First Interstate (the
"Intercreditor Agreement"). At such time as the
obligations to First Security have been satisfied and
paid in full, said sales proceeds shall be paid over to
First Interstate.
b. Borrowers covenant and agree to meet the
schedule sales volumes in the Project for each
Marketing Period which is set out in the Project
Marketing Schedule, the proceeds of which will be
applied to reduction of the First Security Loans and
the Notes, in accordance with the Intercreditor Agreement and the Arrangement Agreement; and subject to the
cure and grace provisions hereinafter set forth, in all
events Borrowers shall make principal reduction

payments to First Security for the benefit of First
Security and First Interstate equivalent to those which
would have been provided by reason of sales in the
volumes required under the Project Marketing Schedule
for each Marketing Period.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if, on the last day of any
Marketing Period the specified volume of sales required has
not been accomplished, the default occasioned by the failure
to meet such volume and/or provide the related principal
reduction payment shall not result in immediate exercise of
remedies by First Interstate hereunder so long as by the
said ending date of the Marketing Period, 75 percent of the
sales volume required shall have been accomplished and there
is a reasonable likelihood, in the judgment of First
Interstate and First Security, so long as Borrowers are
indebted to First Security (First Security and First
Interstate may require evidence of bona fide offers to
purchase scheduled to close during such period), that the
remaining 25 percent of such sales may be accomplished
within 45 days after the end of the Marketing Period. First
Interstate agrees to forebear with respect to the exercise
of its default remedies for a period of 45 days in such
eventuality. If during the subsequent 45 day period the
remaining 25 percent of sales volume and/or payment of the
required principal reduction shall have been accomplished
and there is nothing which, in the reasonable judgment of
First Interstate appears to be a continuing problem or
defect which would likely result in a succeeding failure to
meet the Project Marketing Schedule's sales volume required
for the current or any subsequent Marketing Period, the
original default shall be cured and this Agreement shall
proceed as if no such default shall have ever occurred.
6. Project budget. Borrowers agree to provide for
approval of First Interstate and First Security a projected
budget for the operation, maintenance, and marketing of the
Project (the ,fOMM Budget11) . The OMM Budget shall be
adjusted and amended monthly by Borrowers to reflect current
facts and circumstances. So long as the OMM Budget shall
have been and continues to be approved by First Interstate
and First Security (including most recent and current
amendments or modifications thereto), then First Interstate
agrees that certain other proceeds of each sale of any of
the project or of any part of parcel thereof, shall be paid
to Borrowers for purposes of meeting OMM Budget allowed
expenditures, the amount of such allowance (the "Budget
Allowance11) being calculated as follows:
The budget allowance to be paid to Borrowers shall be
the amount obtained by multiplying the amount of
operating, maintenance, and marketing expenses for the
applicable Marketing Period (as set out in the current
approved OMM Budget) by a percentage which shall be
eaual to the Dercentaae obtained bv dividine the cross

sale price of the subject sale by the gross sales
volume required under the Project Sales Scheduled for
the Marketing Period in which the sale occurs.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the subject sale shall be
one which is over the required gross sales volume for the
applicable Marketing Period, then the calculation shall be
made as if in following Marketing Period, or, if applicable,
subsequent Marketing Periods. Further, it is understood and
agreed that the provisions of this paragraph allowing for
disbursements from sales proceeds for expenditures in or
part of the OMM Budget shall be inapplicable upon occurrence
of an event of default under this Agreement or otherwise,
unless a cure period as provided hereunder or in the Notes
is then in effect.
In all events, Borrowers shall, unless consented in writing
by First Interstate and First Security, make only such
expenditures as are contemplated by the approved OMM Budget
and shall incur only such liabilities as shall be also
contemplated by the approved OMM Budget. Further, if
expenses actually incurred during the Marketing Period are
less than those appearing in the OMM Budget, subsequent
adjusting offsets against disbursements from sales proceeds
shall occur (if Borrower shall actually have received sales
related disbursements in the budget for such Marketing
Period).
7. Marketing efforts. As Borrowers understand that
the repayment of the amounts owed to First Interstate
hereunder and those owed to First Security are dependant
upon effective and immediate marketing and sales of the
Project, Borrowers agree to vigorously engage in marketing
of the Project. If First Security and First Interstate
shall require hereinafter in writing, Borrowers will engage
the services of professional managers or marketers or
consultants for purposes of expediting and completing an
orderly and complete sale of the Project (whether by parcel
or as a whole). In that connection, Borrowers agree further
as follows:
a. Borrowers shall submit to First Interstate and
First Security copies of all offers, inquiries, earnest
monies, and other written requests relating to the
purchase of the Project or any portion thereof.
b. Borrowers will immediately submit a proposed
list of sales prices for the Project which shall be
approved and agreed to by First Interstate and First
Security provided that if no such approval can be
obtained, the procedures provided in paragraph 7 of the
Arrangement Agreement shall be immediately implemented.
Borrowers will accept any offer to purchase which

reasonably approximates the prices set in the price
list.
c. Borrowers will keep accurate records of all
expenses and income with respect to the Project and
shall also maintain books, records, and financial
statements appropriate for the control of the Project
and its operation, maintenance and marketing in accordance with the OMM Budget, as approved.
d. Borrowers will submit to First Interstate and
First Security such records, reports, and copies of
such documents as the said lender shall reasonably
request from time to time, as the same relate to the
physical status of the Project, its marketing, and all
sales or other dispositions.
e. Unless approved in writing by First Interstate
and First Security, no sale of any part or parcel of
the Project shall be for other than cash and all
parties agree that "sale" as used herein shall only be
a sale upon actual closing, transfer of title, and
payment of purchase price by the buyer or on buyer's
behalf.
f. Borrowers shall allow representatives of First
Interstate and First Security access to the Project at
any time and shall also allow them opportunity at any
reasonable hour to inspect the books and records of the
Borrowers and shall provide for access by said lenders
to the sales records and other marketing records which
may be kept by third parties as they respect the
Project.
g. Borrowers shall make no listing arrangement,
contract for consulting for marketing or disposition of
the Project or any part of parcel thereof without the
prior written approval of First Interstate and First
Security, which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
h. Borrowers do hereby warrant and represent to
First Interstate that they have the title, right and
interest necessary to grant the security interest,
assignments, and liens in the items of collateral
securing the Notes.
i. Borrowers are in compliance with all laws,
regulations, and governmental authority with respect to
the Project and any of the property in which security
interest or liens are granted to secure the Notes and
will continue such compliance and observance hereafter.

j. Borrowers shall take all reasonable actions
necessary to preserve the assets and property in which
First Interstate has a security interest to secure the
Notes, including paying all necessary taxes or other
impositions or assessments, physically maintaining the
same, providing such care and feeding as may be required, and maintaining such insurance against hazards
and other risks as First Interstate may require in
connection with the same. Such insurance as is maintained shall be in form satisfactory to First
Interstate and shall, as requested and available,
contain loss payable clauses in favor of First
Interstate as secured party or mortgagee.
k. Except as provided for and contemplated by
this Agreement, the Arrangement Agreement and documents
related thereto, Borrowers agree not to further encumber or pledge any of their respective assets to any
other person or persons.
1. Borrower shall take no actions and enter into
no contracts, leases or other agreements without the
prior written consent of First Interstate which will
materially and adversely effect the ability of
Borrowers to market the Project in compliance with the
requirements of the Project Marketing Schedule.
8. Other modifications — continuation of other terms.
First Interstate hereby agrees that recourse against Enoch
Smith, Jr. and Margaret Smith shall be and is hereby limited
to items of real and personal property which are or have
been provided as collateral security for the obligations
under the Notes. It is further agreed that Enoch Smith Sons
Co. is relieved from liability under the Partnership Note
and First Interstate1s sole recourse under said partnership
note shall be to the collateral pledged as security therefor.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the aforesaid release and
nonrecourse covenant is based upon representations and
warranties of Enoch Smith, Jr. and Margaret Smith relative
to their overall assets and their rights in assets given as
collateral security for the Notes. Accordingly, in the
event that there shall have been any material and intentional misrepresentation (including the failure to disclose
material facts) the aforesaid nonrecourse covenant shall be
void and of no force or effect. Further, the releases made
hereunder shall in no way result in (unless otherwise
provided in writing signed by First Interstate) a release or
waiver of claim for any other persons, entities, or parties
obligated on the loans mentioned hereinabove.
9. Subordination. Enoch Smith, Jr. and Enoch Richard
Smith further agree and hereby do subordinate their rights
as partners of Park Meadows Investment Co. to receive

proceeds from Park Meadows Mountain,
a Utah general
partnership, to First Interstatefs rights to payments under
the Notes, and agree that any payments or proceeds so
received will be promptly paid over to First Interstate
until such time as the Notes are paid in full.
10. Other terms. In all other respects, the terms and
conditions of the Notes shall continue to be in full force
and effect, including, but not limited to, collateral
pledged and guarantees.
11. Subordination. Bank hereby acknowledges and
agrees that Borrowers are contemporaneously herewith
executing in favor of Bank trust deeds on real property
known as Park Meadows, X-S Storage, St. George Condos, Smith
Park Acres Ranch and the Kentucky Ranch (by mortgage
instrument) and that said trust deeds and mortgage shall be
subordinate and inferior to a similar pledge to First
Security, all as contemplated by the Arrangement Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto do set their
hands and cause the execution
of this Agreement, effective
on the "effective date11 first set forth hereinabove.
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO.
(a.k.a. Park Meadows
Development Co.)
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The attached Marketing Schedule/Budget shall
be reviewed and analyzed by Borrowers, First Security
and First Interstate. The parties shall cooperate
in establishing the quarterly goals of marketing and
quarterly budget requirements, based upon the cmnual
totals in the attached schedule. The parties shall
also consider the effect of, and an appropriate
adjustment regarding the period from the date of this
Schedule, July 23, 1985, to the end of the calendar
quarter, September 30, 1985.
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Assumptions.- 1.
2.
3.

Current Inventory ($3,307,108? discounted 30% except
Gleaneacles. Gleneacles is discounted 44*. Total of
$5,563,976 / 3years = $ 1,856,325.
Price per unit to esclate $ 5,000 per year
Calendar year to begin when settlement agreement
is reached.
Park Yeacows (Yeacows Only 973 units)
Potential Pro Porna Cash Plow 3 years
1335 to 1988
1985-86

Income
Parcel Units Sold (15
Price/Parcel Ur.its(2)
Current Inventory
Total Income
Operating Expenses
Gen & Admin (4)
. C - .\

.T.CCU

v^<w

'.*»'/

1986-87

326
326
25000
30000
1856325 1856325
100C6325 11636325
315000
- ^ w \^ s.- •«.

33705c
-, w \ u ^•• v. N-/

1987—88

327
35000
1356325
13301325
360644
O \s \s \s \J

465v(r
79SC7S
266C26
66667
1337441
11463884

Ac.vert-s«nc, (6}
Sales Corm. (7)
Miscei:ar.eous(S)
Property Taxes(3)
Total Expenses
Oper. Cash Flow

Zuu./.c
6CC3T5
200126
200C0C
1635631
8370634

Capital Improvements
Struc. Dev. (10 5
C » U D jiouse \ + * i
7er.r.is Club (l?;.

1733600

1392000

• *fl"5tf*A

* ^ ^ « ^ « «

Cash Flow 3efore
Ir.terest & Debt
Reductior. (13)

6637C94

3510304

11463SS4

Cther 3ebt
Ir.terest Payr.er.t f 14)
Principal Seducticr.

666666
666666
173C0CC 1360357
4130423 6432631

666666
7126S9
7126391

™*-s*^"

Loar. "3alar.ee: $17,800,000 136^357?
? 10% Interest
Net Profit 3e?ore
Taxes fi 3eor.

CJ*I.:<:

633173
232726
133333
1734021
9902304

7126331
295763S

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
First Interstate Bank of Utah this 22nd day of November, 1989,
to the following:
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq.
Mark J. Taylor, Esq.
Victoria K. Kidman, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellees Beckers and Dougans
Hardin A. Whitney, Esq.
Jeffrey Robinson, Esq.
Moyle & Draper
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-115
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellee Park Meadows
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